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DO DISRUPTIVE VISIONS PAY OFF? THE IMPACT OF DISRUPTIVE ENTREPRENEURIAL VISIONS ON 
VENTURE FUNDING 
 
ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurs often articulate a vision for their venture that purports to fundamentally change, 
disturb, or re-order the ways in which organizations, markets, and ecosystems operate. We call 
these visions disruptive visions. Neglected in both the disruption and the impression management 
literature, disruptive visions are widespread in business practice. We integrate real options and 
impression management theories to hypothesize that articulating a disruptive vision raises investors’ 
expectations of extraordinary returns, which in turn increases the likelihood of the venture receiving 
funding but reduces the amount of funding obtained. A novel dataset of Israeli start-ups shows that 
a standard deviation increase in disruptive vision communication increases the odds of receiving a 
first round of funding by 22 percent, but reduces amounts of funds received by 24 percent. A 
randomized online experiment corroborates these findings and further demonstrates that the 
expectation of extraordinary returns is the key mechanism driving investors’ sensemaking. 
Keywords: disruption; disruptive vision; entrepreneur; impression management; venture funding; 
vision communication.  
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DO DISRUPTIVE VISIONS PAY OFF? THE IMPACT OF DISRUPTIVE ENTREPRENEURIAL VISIONS ON 
VENTURE FUNDING 
Disruption has become a hot topic in recent years both in research (Hopp, Antons, Kaminski, & Salge, 
2018) and in practice (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 2015)—from practitioners citing lists of 
successful disruptors (Howard, 2013), encouraging ventures to develop disruptive business models 
(e.g., Berry, 2012), appointing ‘Chief Disruption Officers’ (Carr, 2013), to naming an entire 
entrepreneur trade show (e.g., TechCrunch Disrupt). While there is disagreement over how to define 
and identify disruptive innovations in both academic literature (Christensen et al., 2015; Danneels, 
2004; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015) and the business press (Lepore, 2014; The Economist, 2015), 
there is general consensus on the outcome of disruption being a fundamental change, disturbance, 
or re-ordering of the ways in which organizations, markets, and ecosystems operate. For disruption 
to occur, the entrepreneur’s communications are crucial in persuading ecosystem members to 
embrace the new venture and its innovation (Ansari, Garud, & Kumaraswamy, 2016; Gurses & 
Ozcan, 2015). Communications by entrepreneurs can motivate potential customers to try new 
products, encourage suppliers and incumbents to collaborate, and, above all, convince investors to 
fund the venture. For example, investors often rely on the entrepreneur’s communications to make 
sense of the new venture, especially in early stage investments where the uncertainty surrounding a 
venture’s viability is highest (e.g., Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens, 
Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011).  
As documented by prior research into disruption and impression management, entrepreneurs follow 
impression management strategies (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Lounsbury & 
Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011; Zott & Huy, 
2007) that showcase high-status affiliations (Burton, Sorensen, & Beckman, 2002), industry 
leadership (Martens et al., 2007), entrepreneurial track record, and the venture’s resource base 
(Bernstein, Korteweg, & Laws, 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) in order to shape investors’ 
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sensemaking of the venture. However, these impression management strategies are backward-
looking entrepreneurial communications, describing ‘who the entrepreneurs are’ and ‘what the 
venture does.’ Although Garud et al. (2014) have recently recognized the importance of future-
oriented communications that promote ‘what the venture will become’ and ‘what the entrepreneurs 
will achieve,’ there is little research on the extent to which forward-looking communications 
influence investor perceptions of a venture. Gaining insight into the entrepreneur’s future-oriented 
communications is vital as it enables scholars in entrepreneurship, disruption and impression 
management fields to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between the entrepreneur’s 
activities and disruption, which is essentially a future event that the entrepreneurs may aim to 
achieve. 
As a form of future-oriented impression management in the disruption process, we introduce and 
define disruptive visions—the thematic content of vision communication that articulates intentions 
to disrupt organizations, markets, and ecosystems. Vision communication aims to impart stories and 
images of the future of a collective (e.g., technology, customers, or ecosystems) (Berson, Shamir, 
Avolio, & Popper, 2001; Garud et al., 2014; House & Shamir, 1993; Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014). 
Similar to the use of ‘disruptive innovation’ as a modifying label for innovations aiming to upend 
incumbent offerings (Christensen, McDonald, Altman, & Palmer, WP; Christensen, 1997), we use 
‘disruptive vision’ as a label for an entrepreneur’s vision to upend existing market structures. In that 
regard, our conceptualization of disruption and disruptive vision reflects how entrepreneurs and 
investors understand disruption in practice (e.g., Cosper, 2015; Rachleff, 2013; The Economist, 
2015).  
We examine how the communication of a disruptive vision drives the likelihood and the amount of 
an initial round of funding. We argue that the more that a venture’s vision communication portrays 
an image of disruption, the higher the odds of receiving first-round funding, since the game-changing 
appeal of a potential disruption fosters expectation of extraordinary investor returns. However, a 
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highly disruptive vision also conveys uncertainty regarding a venture’s potential for success, 
deterring investors from making large speculative investments into the venture. We thus 
hypothesize that communicating a more disruptive vision increases the likelihood of first-round 
funding (i.e., Seed funding or Series A) while it shrinks the amount of capital received. We tested 
these hypotheses in two complementary studies. In Study 1, we used a unique dataset of start-ups in 
Israel—a well-known cradle of entrepreneurship with more high-tech start-ups per capita than any 
other country (Senor & Singer, 2009). We found that increasing a venture’s disruptive vision 
communication by one standard deviation improved the odds of receiving funding by 22 percent. 
We also noted that one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision communication cut the 
amount of funds invested by 24 percent—amounting to $87,000 for a typical venture in the Seed 
round, and $361,000 in the series A funding round. In Study 2, we replicated these results in a 
randomized online experiment to ascertain whether investor expectation of extraordinary returns is 
the mechanism driving these results.  
We offer several contributions to the literature on disruption, impression management, and 
entrepreneurial visions. First, in its classical formulation, the disruption process is explained as 
relative performance trajectories of competing technologies (Christensen, 1997). Recent research, 
however, has also unearthed the role of entrepreneurs’ framing of innovations during the disruption 
process (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). We introduce and provide a deeper 
understanding of the role entrepreneurial visions play in acquiring resources critical to the disruption 
process. Second, we contribute to the burgeoning stream of literature on impression management, 
which notes that entrepreneurs frame communications to foster categorization and to establish 
their ventures’ identities (e.g., Cornelissen & Werner, 2014; Martens et al., 2007; Navis & Glynn, 
2011; van Werven, Bouwmeester, & Cornelissen, 2015; Zott & Huy, 2007). Until now, there has been 
limited examination of the relative impacts of future-oriented communications on outcomes at the 
venture level (Garud et al., 2014). We assess the efficacy of future-oriented communications for 
early stage ventures and introduce a new category of impression management strategies: the 
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communication of disruptive visions. Third, we integrate research on real options and impression 
management by positing how impression management affects investor evaluations of ventures as 
real options. We demonstrate opposing effects of impression management on the selection and 
endowment of investment options. Fourth, we challenge prior research on entrepreneurial visions 
espousing only a positive impact from strong vision communication (e.g., Baum & Locke, 2004; 
Baum, Locke, & Kirkpatrick, 1998; Elenkov, Judge, & Wright, 2005). Our study is the first to show that 
specific thematic contents of entrepreneurial visions may damage an entrepreneur’s ability to 
attract large investments. Equally important, we offer practical advice for entrepreneurial framing of 
disruptive visions and highlight the consequences of following it.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Impression Management and Investor Sensemaking 
Prior research on disruption and impression management has argued that entrepreneurs’ 
impression management efforts are key in the disruption process. Ansari et al. (2016) and Gurses 
and Ozcan (2015) have shown that framing value propositions as complementary to incumbents has 
been critical for achieving disruption in the digital video recording and pay-TV industries. Impression 
management activities have also included communications about venture activities, innovations, 
capabilities, achievements, and affiliations that help regulators, competitors, suppliers, and investors 
to embrace the venture (Fisher, Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Hallen, 2008; Huang & 
Pearce, 2015; Martens et al., 2007; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014; Zott & Huy, 2007). These 
communications attempt to establish identities that distinguish the venture from other market 
constituents in the eyes of investors (i.e., optimal distinctiveness, Glynn & Navis, 2013). Such well-
established identities define who the entrepreneurs are and what the ventures do (Navis & Glynn, 
2011). These presentations aim to showcase the venture as “desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  
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Entrepreneurs attempt to set themselves apart in at least three ways (Bernstein et al., 2017; Burton 
et al., 2002; Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Huang & Pearce, 2015; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Martens et al., 2007; Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007). One, they may feature 
track records and past performances of the entrepreneur(s) and/or the team (e.g., entrepreneur or 
employee tenure, experience, or successful prior exits). Two, they may highlight market success as a 
venture (e.g., attaining industry leadership or first-mover status, winning awards and prizes, or 
achieving customer favor). Three, they may stress resource-based advantages (e.g., networks, 
affiliations, technologies, patents, or prototypes). Table 1 lists examples of such communications 
within our dataset.  
These impression management efforts are, by their very nature, backward-looking, with a focus on 
the entrepreneurs’ and/or ventures’ identities and past or current accomplishments (cf. Hallen, 
2008). While the extant literature has recently recognized the importance of future-oriented 
communications (Garud et al., 2014), studies of disruption and impression management have 
omitted vision communication—that is, conveying stories and images of the future of the venture 
and its ecosystem (e.g., including technology, customers, and/or competitors) (Berson et al., 2001; 
Garud et al., 2014; House & Shamir, 1993; Van Knippenberg & Stam, 2014). Specifically, 
entrepreneurial visions are future-oriented impression management efforts and outline ‘what the 
venture will become,’ and ‘what it will attain.’ This is a key omission since vision communication 
prompts distinctive cues of entrepreneurial identities (cf. Navis & Glynn, 2011; van Werven et al., 
2015). Specifically, vision content (e.g., with a focus on disruption) affects investor perceptions of 
the intrinsic or substantive value of what the venture aims to achieve (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014), 
and influences what people think is desirable or possible for members of the ecosystem and for 
themselves to achieve (Stam, Lord, Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2014; Wry et al., 2011). Entrepreneurial 
visions can, thereby, motivate audiences to act in support of the venture’s pursuits (Baum et al., 
1998; Stam et al., 2014). Since stakeholders within a venture’s ecosystem shape how the disruption 
process unfolds (Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), some entrepreneurs choose to articulate 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
disruptive visions to influence investors. In the following section, we introduce and conceptualize 
disruptive visions to develop a more complete picture of how the disruptiveness of entrepreneurial 
visions affects acquisition of funding. 
Disruptive Vision  
Disruptive innovation theory defines disruptive innovations as innovations with initially inferior 
performance attributes, with the potential to dethrone incumbent technologies, services and/or 
business models (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). However, there is a heated 
ongoing debate of how to define disruptive innovations (e.g., whether they underperform initially, 
whether they improve over time, whether they are introduced by new entrants, whether they 
progress toward the mainstream solely through a niche market, etc.) (Christensen et al., 2015; 
Danneels, 2004; King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Markides, 2006; Tellis, 2006). The core insight 
emanating from this debate is that disruptive innovations should be separated from their outcome: 
disruption (Sood & Tellis, 2011). Understood from a practitioner perspective (The Economist, 2015), 
old market linkages in a disrupted market or ecosystem become uprooted in favor of new ones. 
Therefore, a disrupted market or ecosystem hosts new firms, new market leaders, new products, 
and new ways of doing business. This view also aligns closely with the description of disruption by 
Christensen et al. (2015, p. 46) as being “able to successfully challenge established incumbent 
businesses.” Similarly, Ansari et al. (2016, p. 4) place disruption in ecosystem domains where 
incumbent business models are disturbed by the adoption of an innovation in that ecosystem. Thus, 
while the extant research still lacks consensus on the antecedents, drivers, or definition of 
disruption, there is more convergence on the generally observed outcomes of disruption.  
Disruption is contingent upon the persuasion of various stakeholders in the ecosystem, which can be 
achieved through the entrepreneur’s communications (Ansari et al., 2016). Hence, a disruptive vision 
communicates an image of disruption. A disruptive vision details deficiencies in the current market, 
and promises a paradigm shift that will mark “a [considerable] difference or break from the previous 
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business models and products in an industry or market” (Cornelissen, 2013, p. 708). This impending 
change is framed as an opportunity for improvement and advantage (Mullins & Komisar, 2010). 
Since fundamental changes tend to arise from innovations (Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003), disruptive 
visions cast their images of a disrupted market as completely new approaches to business stemming 
from innovation. Therefore, a disruptive vision spotlights an innovation that promotes new 
functionality, formerly unseen in the market, and that purports to achieve conventional market 
objectives in a very different way.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Disruptive Visions and Investment Acquisition 
To explain how a disruptive vision affects investor sensemaking, we turn to the literature on 
impression management and real options theory. Both are often used to explain investment 
decisions under uncertainty (Huang & Knight, 2017; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). Impression 
management refers to the entrepreneur’s communication of symbolic cues and narratives to 
investors that, in turn, influence how investors make sense of the venture. Sensemaking is the 
process by which investors rationalize what the venture is doing and give meaning to its assessment 
as an investment opportunity (cf. Navis & Glynn, 2011; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The 
central premise underlying real options theory is that an investor has the ability or freedom to act 
(e.g., exercise, defer, expand, or abandon) at any point in time on the options they hold (Klingebiel & 
Adner, 2015). An early stage investment can be viewed as a real option since investors have the 
ability to fund a position later when new details about a venture’s prospects arise. The value of a 
real option is determined by investors’ perception of the balance between the venture’s potential 
upside and any associated risks (Hoffmann & Post, 2017). We argue that this perception, and thus 
real option valuation, can be influenced by an entrepreneur’s impression management efforts, on 
top of traditional data on venture or entrepreneur status, experience, and prior achievements 
available to investors.  
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Disruption, if achieved, has the power to create new industry leaders and shift overall market 
demand from existing products, services, or business models to new ones. A successful disruption 
may create an industry shake-out, with the candidate venture controlling the dominant design 
(Argyres, Bigelow, & Nickerson, 2015), thereby yielding extraordinary returns for the responsible 
venture and its investors. Thus, ventures can create the expectation of extraordinary returns by 
communicating a vision of disruption. Such ventures may be alluring options among wider holdings 
of early stage investments, since returns in such portfolios tend to follow the power law whereby 
the best-return investment exceeds the combined returns of all remaining investment options 
(Maples Jr., 2016). Therefore, a single huge success can ensure the viability of the investor’s entire 
portfolio (Ruhnka & Young, 1991).  
Conversely, images of disruption may also be associated with greater potential exposure to 
uncertainty. Nonetheless, investors are often prepared to accept risk of the unknown if the focal 
venture has a chance of becoming a great success (Huang & Pearce, 2015). Here, a large gain not 
only ensures portfolio viability, but also improves public image among fellow investors (Dimov, 
Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007; Gompers, 1996). Moreover, risk tolerance is bolstered when the option 
permits the exercising or abandoning of an investment at a later stage, when the speculative risks 
become clearer.  
A highly disruptive vision also instills a fear of missing out on the next big change in the market. 
Investors may act on the anticipated regret of forgone extraordinary returns. This is especially the 
case when the investors face the prospect of a competitor capitalizing on the ensuing upheaval in 
the marketplace and the extraordinary returns associated with such a change (Hooshangi & 
Loewenstein, 2018). Hence, a fear of missing out a potentially significant investment opportunity 
may drive investors to select the venture as an investment option. 
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Furthermore, since a venture’s vision of disruption implies the potential loss of valuable 
competencies in current market structures and dynamics (Henderson, 2006), as well as potential 
obsolescence in an investor’s current portfolio, market linkages between ecosystem participants 
may not persist. This drives investors to select an option that hedges against the potential loss of 
market access and increases the flexibility to exercise diversified strategic alternatives at a later 
stage. Consequently, early stage investors may be prompted by disruptive vision communication to 
see the venture as an option for future extraordinary returns. Therefore, we argue that:  
Hypothesis 1: The more disruptive a venture’s vision communication, the higher the 
likelihood of attracting financial investments.  
Disruptive Visions and Amount of Investment Acquired 
We hypothesize a negative effect of disruptive vision on the amount of funding provided by 
investors. We return to real options theory and impression management literature to elaborate the 
negative effect of disruptive vision. Because options (e.g., the right to increase or abandon an 
investment) can be exercised at later stages of market development when the level of uncertainty 
regarding the new venture has reduced, there is less incentive for investors to provide large 
amounts of capital during initial stages (Klingebiel & Adner, 2015).  
While investments in all young ventures are risky and uncertain, the perception of this risk and 
uncertainty is largely shaped by how the entrepreneurs communicate their visions and form 
impressions in the minds of potential investors (Huang & Pearce, 2015; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). 
These perceptions affect the amount of funding acquired from investors. Articulation of a highly 
disruptive vision increases uncertainty about the outcome. The more disruptive the vision, the more 
likely is the investors’ perception that a venture may need to diverge from specific plans (Garud et 
al., 2014). Additionally, research has shown that excessive promotions of innovation and novelty 
force investors to weigh the challenges in commercializing the innovation more carefully (Dimov & 
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Murray, 2008; Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014) and may point investors toward the possibility that 
unknown fatal flaws in the business idea exist (Maxwell et al., 2011).  
A disruptive vision thus discourages high-volume stakes in a venture. This is because investors tend 
to be risk-averse toward low probabilities of success that hinder overall portfolio returns (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Instead, investors take smaller positions (i.e., investments) in a venture that 
communicates a more disruptive vision than in a less disruptive one, and await market news before 
exercising further options. We argue that the communication of a disruptive vision has a direct 
negative effect on the amount of financial funding in a first investment round. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Communicating a more disruptive vision lowers the amount of venture 
funding.  
Expectation of Extraordinary Returns and its Mediating Effects 
When ventures successfully ‘disrupt’ the status quo of existing products, firms, or markets, they may 
create an industry shake-out with the candidate venture becoming the dominant player. Ventures 
that communicate a disruptive vision often promise huge opportunities for investors. However, 
disruption is difficult to achieve and the necessary steps and timing are largely unknown. The distant 
and volatile nature of disruption entails high risks that are unknowable. The tension between the 
great potential opportunity and the endemic riskiness fosters an investor mindset that a venture’s 
business idea is “something so ridiculous that it could actually work” (Huang & Pearce, 2015, p. 641), 
possibly generating returns on investment (ROI) of tenfold or better (Sahlman, 1990) through an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) or exit sale to another entity (Prowse, 1998). Overall, this game-changing 
appeal of a disruptive vision lures investors with the expectation of a significant investment outcome 
among a portfolio of early stage investments.  
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The expectation of extraordinary returns logically increases the likelihood of funding. Investors 
naturally pursue unconventionally high investment returns (Huang & Pearce, 2015). Yet, early stage 
investments are also associated with higher likelihood of subsequent losses. As an offset, early stage 
investors expect exceptionally high rates of return (Ruhnka & Young, 1991) that help ensure the 
viability of their portfolios (Maples Jr., 2016). 
Moreover, seizing investment opportunities that yield large ROIs increases the visibility and standing 
of investors among fellow capitalists (Dimov et al., 2007). For example, early investors in ventures 
that disrupt markets and ecosystems are often celebrated in entrepreneurial circles (e.g., Peter Thiel 
for Facebook; Jeremy Liew’s Lightspeed Venture Partners for Snapchat; Chris Fralic’s first round 
capital for Uber). Such gains in visibility are important as they may attract larger capital flows to the 
investor’s fund later (Gompers, 1996). In addition, leaving such an opportunity unexploited adds to 
the anticipated regret of missing out on the potential monetary and social gains. 
In contrast, the lack of a disruptive vision may cool expectation of extraordinary returns, hampering 
the venture’s profile as a valuable investment option among others. Thus, the stronger the 
expectation of extraordinary returns created by a disruptive vision, the more likely it is that investors 
will take an option in the venture.  
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between the disruptiveness of a venture’s vision 
communication and the likelihood of attracting financial investments is mediated by the 
investor’s expectation of extraordinary returns.  
Arguably, investors who perceive a venture as likely to offer extraordinary returns might also 
increase their stakes in that venture. For example, if investors believe it to be highly likely that the 
venture will increase its valuation tenfold within five years, they may be more inclined to capitalize 
on the opportunity, seeking a higher stake in the venture and thus endowing the venture with more 
financial capital. In such a case, there should be a positive relationship between the expectation of 
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extraordinary returns and the amount funded. Because highly disruptive visions positively affect the 
expectation of extraordinary return, we argue that disruptive visions also exert a positive, indirect 
impact on the amount of funding from investors (i.e., similar to our arguments for Hypothesis 3) 
through the expectation of extraordinary returns.  
Despite this positive, indirect effect of a disruptive vision through the expectation of extraordinary 
returns, we still expect a negative, direct effect of the disruptive vision on funding amounts (see 
arguments for Hypothesis 2). This is called inconsistent mediation (for details, see Aguinis, Edwards, 
& Bradley, 2017; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; for recent empirical examples, see Gardner, 
Wright, & Moynihan, 2011; Jayasinghe, 2016). With inconsistent mediation, the direct effect of the 
independent variable has an opposing sign to the mediated effect. Incurring the opposite mediating 
effect from the expectation of extraordinary returns helps expose the direct negative effect of the 
disruptive vision on the amounts of funding acquired. 
Hypothesis 4: Expectation of extraordinary returns mediates the relationship between the 
disruptiveness of a venture’s vision communication and the amount of venture funding.  
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
The aim of our paper is to investigate the efficacy of disruptive visions for acquiring a first round of 
funding. We tested our hypotheses using two complementary studies. Our first study uses an archive 
of Israeli start-ups. With this study, we empirically tested the main effects of disruptive visions on 
investment decisions (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 2). This field study also provided ecological validity for 
our findings. Study 2 was comprised of a randomized online experiment that both replicated findings 
from the first study and identified the mechanism underlying the positive effects of disruptive 
visions on investment decisions (i.e., Hypotheses 3 and 4). This experimental study generalized our 
findings beyond the Israeli venture context, and the randomized control nature of the experiment 
pinpointed the causality driving our results. 
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 STUDY 1: THE DISRUPTIVE VISIONS OF ISRAELI START-UPS 
METHOD 
Sample 
We test our hypotheses using a comprehensive database of Israeli start-ups. Israel is often dubbed a 
‘Start-up Nation’ for its strong entrepreneurship scene, having the most high-tech start-ups per 
capita (Senor & Singer, 2009) and a vibrant venture capital scene (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2006). 
Israeli start-ups are young, internationally oriented, knowledge-intensive organizations that mainly 
produce innovative, proprietary self-developed technologies (Engel & del-Palacio, 2011). We 
obtained data from Start-Up Nation Central—a private non-profit organization that has exhaustively 
collected and accurately stored data on all Israeli start-ups since 2013 
(http://www.startupnationcentral.org/). The data featured on Start-Up Nation Finder (Start-Up 
Nation Central’s ‘Innovation Discovery Platform,’ https://finder.startupnationcentral.org) provide 
detailed information on venture activities, products, locations, founders, management teams, 
funding, and investors. 
This dataset is uniquely qualified for testing our hypotheses for two reasons. First, it offers rich and 
reliable information on venture, entrepreneur, and funding outcomes. Second, the data allow us to 
correct for selection bias since they include firms that obtained funds and those that did not. Prior 
research has mainly considered ventures that have already obtained funding (e.g., Gompers, 1995; 
Kanze & Iyengar, 2017; Ter Wal, Alexy, Block, & Sandner, 2016), creating a methodological sample-
selection problem. With our data, we can regress the models on both the likelihood of funding and 
the amount of funding to properly correct for selection bias.  
We sampled ventures founded between 2013 (when Start-Up Nation Central began) and 2016, 
including only their first round of funding (Seed or A round). Our cross-sectional sample totals 2139 
ventures. We randomly chose 1000 start-up firms from this sample. After removing missing values 
for the variables selected in our models, the final dataset contained 918 start-ups.  
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Measures 
Dependent variables 
We coded ventures that had first-round funding as investment received (1 if yes, 0 otherwise). The 
amount of funding received was measured as the amount of funding in US dollars that a venture 
received in its first funding round. Generally, the first funding round referred to a Seed round, but in 
some cases, ventures skipped the Seed round and went straight to the A series—a recent trend 
known as bootstrapping (Newlands, 2015). We applied the natural log of this variable because of 
skewness (Skewness = 4.17, Kurtosis = 21.92, Shapiro-Wilk test W = 0.56, p < 0.001). 
Independent variables 
We followed the standard practice of coding vision statements (e.g., Baum et al., 1998; Baum & 
Locke, 2004; Berson et al., 2001) to measure disruptive vision. Vision statements were displayed on 
the Start-Up Nation Finder for investors. Since the Start-Up Nation Finder platform is used by 
investors to seek and select promising start-ups, these statements are important in entrepreneurs’ 
communication with investors. Two graduate assistants coded the vision statements. After initial 
instruction meetings and resolution of disagreements on a trial set of vision statements, the two 
coders were directed to proceed in isolation and refrain from any further discussion.  
A disruptive vision conveys a drastic change in the way organizations or ecosystems operate, 
showcasing a significant break from existing products, services, and business models (Cornelissen, 
2013). Since fundamental changes tend to emerge from innovations (Ireland et al., 2003), disruptive 
visions evoke images of a disrupted market and a new approach to business stemming from 
innovation. Therefore, we operationalized disruptive vision using the following four items indicating 
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise) whether the vision statement (i) “promotes drastic [or fundamental] change in 
the future: it makes a claim of pursuing dramatic change at a market or larger level, with implicit 
consequences for multiple stakeholders” (Kappa = 0.61); (ii) “features a future that contrasts with 
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the status quo: it delineates deficiencies in the current market situation and promises a substantial 
improvement” (Kappa = 0.66); (iii) “includes ideas, plans or other evidence of achieving the 
conventional market objective in a completely different manner” (Kappa = 0.46); and (iv) “promotes 
the venture’s innovation or activities as enabling a completely new function” (Kappa = 0.21). 
Because of the low Kappa value of the last item, we removed it from our measure for empirical 
purposes.i On the three-item measure, both coders presented sufficient agreement across items per 
vision statement (mean Rwg = 0.83). Next, the average for the two coders was calculated for each 
item. The resulting averages were then summed to calculate a disruptive vision score per statement. 
The coders displayed good agreement and reliability in the calculated disruptive vision measure 
(mean ICC2 = 0.82).  
Control variables 
We drew from prior literature to identify four sets of control variables in our models related to the 
characteristics of the venture and its communications, the founders, the product and market, and 
the funding round.  
The first set of controls included traits of a venture’s communication style and reach. We controlled 
for a venture’s social media exposure, since this may increase the visibility of the venture and 
enhance investor awareness (Fischer & Reuber, 2011). Start-Up Nation Finder displays direct links to 
various social media platforms (i.e., Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, and Twitter). We operationalized 
social media exposure by measuring the number of social media platforms for which the venture had 
a link in the Start-Up Nation Finder database.  
We also controlled for the extent to which a venture’s vision statement includes the promotion of 
achievements. Investors may conduct their own due diligence about a venture’s and its 
entrepreneur’s achievements, having alternative sources to assess claims. However, prior research 
on impression management agrees that investors also rely on cues conveyed by entrepreneurs. In 
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particular, the emphasis on achievements may be an important determinant of the credibility and 
legitimacy of a venture’s claims in the eyes of investors. The coders rated each company statement 
regarding three items indicating (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) whether it (i) “features evidence of past 
performance/experience of entrepreneurs and employees” (Kappa = 0.69); (ii) “presents evidence of 
past and current successes of the venture in the market, including customers, locations, market 
leadership, and awards and prizes” (Kappa = 0.63); and (iii) “features claims of accrued resources, 
such as the latest/proprietary technology, partnerships/networks/affiliations, and 
patents/prototypes” (Kappa = 0.61). Both coders had high agreement across items per vision 
statement (mean Rwg = 0.88). Next, the average for the two coders was computed for each item, 
and resulting averages were then summed to calculate a score per venture. The coders showed good 
agreement and reliability in the summed promotion of achievements measure (mean ICC2 = 0.84). 
Vision communication is often associated with imagery (Emrich, Brower, Feldman, & Garland, 2001). 
Messages high in imagery induce more vivid portraits of what is communicated (Carton, Murphy, & 
Clark, 2014). We controlled for imagery to isolate the effect of disruptive visions beyond imagery. 
We used the Toronto Word Pool, which rates words on degrees of imagery using a 1-to-7 scale 
(Friendly, Franklin, Hoffman, & Rubin, 1982). Imagery scores were then averaged for the words in a 
venture’s vision statement.  
The second set of controls pertained to features of the venture itself. Venture capitalists and angel 
investors who focus on early stage investments are more likely to favor younger ventures (Huang & 
Pearce, 2015; Ter Wal et al., 2016). Therefore, we controlled for venture age by subtracting the year 
of founding from 2016. Furthermore, if start-ups stated in the vision statement that they were a part 
of another firm, we coded them as Subsidiary ventures. We included this as a control since these 
ventures may require and receive different levels of external funding due to affiliation with a larger 
established firm (D’Mello, Krishnaswami, & Larkin, 2008). We also coded whether ventures were 
members of (corporate) accelerators, co-working environments, or entrepreneurship programs, as 
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these relationships assist ventures in developing their activities, markets, strategy, and resources. 
These programs may also offer networking, educational, mentorship, and pitch-making 
opportunities (Cohen, 2013). We mark ventures as a Member of a program using a dummy variable 
in our models (member = 1, non-member = 0). 
Additionally, Start-Up Nation Finder displays categorizing tags on a venture’s page. By clicking a tag, 
ventures with similar characteristics can be found. By including the Number of tags in our models, 
we controlled the exposure to investors through Start-Up Nation Finder. This skewed variable was 
log-transformed (Skewness = 1.03, Kurtosis = 3.73, W = 0.95, p < 0.001). Finally, ventures in our 
dataset were assigned to one sector: software, healthcare, security and safety technologies, or 
other. We included sector dummies because funding requirements and timing vary across sectors. 
The third set of controls pertains to founder, and product and market characteristics. We controlled 
for serial entrepreneurship. Serial entrepreneurs can call upon amassed experience and networks 
that enable access to valuable resources (Cassar, 2014). We coded Serial entrepreneur as 1 if a (co-
)founder appeared as a (co-)founder of another start-up in our full database (i.e., including all 
ventures in the Start-Up Nation Finder database that were founded before 2017). We controlled for 
geographic scope since the number of target markets can affect sales and growth potential as well 
as capital needs in serving different markets (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). Start-Up Nation Finder lists 
each start-up’s geographical target markets. Geographic areas included North and South America, 
Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle-East, and Oceania. Geographic scope was proxied by tallying the 
regions where a venture was active. Furthermore, products in research and development phases are 
riskier investments than those already launched (Audretsch, Bönte, & Mahagaonkar, 2012). We 
controlled for the stage of development by including a dummy variable, Released product, marked as 
“1” when a venture’s products were released commercially, or as “0” otherwise. 
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Finally, we included two control variables for a venture’s first-round funding. In our analysis, we 
included only ventures initiating Series A or Seed funding. Generally, funding levels increase with the 
funding series, and start-ups can leapfrog through bootstrapping—i.e., building and growing a 
venture with personal finances or using initial operating cash flow (Newlands, 2015). We included a 
dummy variable in our models for A-Round funding to indicate ventures that bypassed the Seed 
round and went straight to A-series in their first round. Lastly, we controlled for investor prior 
experience as this may influence investment decisions (Huang & Pearce, 2015). We operationalized 
investor experience by averaging the total number of funding rounds the investors took part in 
before the focal funding round. We calculated this variable using the full database, including all 
funding rounds in the Start-Up Nation Finder database that occurred prior to 2017. 
Analytical Approach 
The fact that funding decisions by investors are not random may introduce bias into our coefficient 
estimates for the amount of funds acquired. To mitigate sample-selection bias induced by a non-
random selection of observations for received funds, we applied the Heckman correction using “full-
information maximum-likelihood” estimation (FIML). The FIML estimator offers more efficiency than 
the two-step estimator (Greene, 2012) since all parameters of the selection and outcome equations 
are estimated simultaneously using the likelihood function (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, & Semadeni, 
2016).  
Prior research advises an exclusion restriction such that there is at least one variable with a non-zero 
coefficient in a selection equation estimating acquired funds that is excluded from the outcome 
equation estimating funding amount (Certo et al., 2016). We used number of tags and social media 
exposure as exclusionary variables since they proxy the probability that an investor landed at the 
venture’s page on Start-Up Nation Finder via click-through (internal and external, respectively). Both 
elements primarily influence the awareness of a venture and, thus, its likelihood of funding, but not 
the amount of funding. After all, the number of tags or social media links is quite uninformative 
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about venture risk or upside potential. In the results section to follow, we discuss diagnostics 
regarding our selection correction approach. 
We used Probit regression to estimate the selection equation for a venture’s propensity to receive a 
first investment round. To test Hypothesis 1 concerning the likelihood of obtaining a first funding 
round, we conduct and report on a logistic regression instead of the Probit selection equation.ii The 
model specification of our logistic regression was identical to that of the Probit selection equation. 
RESULTS 
We first report the descriptive statistics and bi-variate correlations as model-free evidence. Tables 
2a and 2b present descriptive statistics for all variables in Study 1. We observe that ventures were 
almost two-years old on average, operated mostly in one geographic area, and that 43 percent of 
ventures operated in the software sector. Furthermore, we note that 38 percent of ventures had 
released products, 47 percent were founded by at least one serial entrepreneur, nearly 18 percent 
had an A-series as first-round funding, and that 7.5 percent of ventures were subsidiaries. 
Importantly, only 14.8 percent of ventures received an investment, and those that did, acquired an 
average of $905,227 (geometric mean).  
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlations. We observe that venture age has a significant positive 
association with having received an investment, but a negative association with the amount of 
funding received. Older ventures also are more likely to release products and to be active in social 
media. Importantly for the exclusion restrictions, ventures with more links to social platforms and 
more tags on their Start-Up Nation Finder page were positively correlated with receiving an 
investment, but not with the amount of investment received. We also observe that the promotion of 
achievements was positively and significantly correlated with both receiving funding and acquiring 
higher amounts. Regarding our main variable of interest: we observe a positive significant 
association of a disruptive vision with receiving an investment; and while not significant, but in line 
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with our inconsistent mediation hypothesis, we note a negative association of a disruptive vision 
with the amount of funding.   
Sample-Selection Correction Diagnostics 
Sample selection impacted our data since the independent variable predicted significantly in the 
selection equation, and rho emerged as significant in our full model (rho = -0.81, S.E. = 0.13, p < 
0.001, Model 4 in Table 4) (Certo et al., 2016). Moreover, our independent variable did not correlate 
with error terms of the selection equation (r < 0.01, p = 0.94) or the outcome equation (r < 0.01, p = 
0.99), and thus proved to be exogenous. Therefore, we deemed the results of our outcome equation 
to be unbiased (Certo et al., 2016). Also, the correlation between our independent variable and the 
inverse Mills ratio was lower than 0.30 in absolute terms (r = -0.24, p < 0.001), indicating sufficient 
strength for our exclusion restrictions (Certo et al., 2016). Last, a likelihood ratio test (χ2 = 52.52, df. 
= 2, p < 0.001) between the over-identified model (i.e., using our full model specification; log 
likelihood = -544.26) and the just-identified model (i.e., model without exclusion restrictions; log 
likelihood = -570.52) showed that applying our exclusion restrictions significantly improved the 
overall fit of the model. These results validated the adequacy of our analytical approach and the 
selection of exclusion restrictions. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Table 4 shows results of the logistic regression estimating the likelihood of venture funding. Model 1 
included only control variables. As expected, ventures with more social media exposure (β = 0.69, 
S.E. = 0.12, p < 0.001), a larger number of tags (β = 0.70, S.E. = 0.30, p = 0.02), and that promoted 
more achievements (β = 0.27, S.E. = 0.09, p = 0.004) were more likely to be funded. Furthermore, the 
model showed that ventures that are members of an accelerator program (β = 0.63, S.E. = 0.24, p = 
0.009), that were founded by serial entrepreneurs (β = 0.36, S.E. = 0.21, p = 0.08, significant at the ɑ 
< 0.1 level), and that served the healthcare (β = 0.69, S.E. = 0.36, p = 0.06) and security and safety (β 
= 1.30, S.E. = 0.33, p < 0.001) sectors were more likely to obtain funding than those in the ‘other’ 
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category. A Wald test showed the overall effect of the sector variable to be significant (χ2 = 19.39, df. 
= 3, p < 0.001), while the difference between the healthcare and security and safety sectors was not 
significant (χ2 = 2.3, df. = 1, p = 0.13). 
Model 2 included the main effects of our independent variable and the control variables on the odds 
of receiving a first investment round. The results of Model 2 supported Hypothesis 1, stating that a 
disruptive vision positively predicts the likelihood of receiving funds (β = 0.20, S.E. = 0.10, p = 0.048). 
We found that one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision increases the odds of acquiring 
funding by 22 percent.  
Table 4 also displays results of our outcome regression equations where we estimated the level of 
funding received by ventures in the first round. Model 3 included control variables. Intuitively, we 
note that ventures with Series A funding (β = 1.42, S.E. = 0.31, p < 0.001), those from the software 
sector (β = 0.70, S.E. = 0.29, p = 0.016), and those with subsidiary ties (β = 0.87, S.E. = 0.46, p = 0.06, 
significant at the ɑ < 0.1 level) received significantly more capital. In addition, experienced investors 
were inclined to provide higher amounts of funding (β = 0.24, S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.026). Conversely, 
older ventures (β = -0.24, S.E. = 0.14, p = 0.078), ventures with a larger geographic scope (β = -0.25, 
S.E. = 0.14, p = 0.069, significant at the ɑ < 0.1 level), and those with released products (β = -0.61, 
S.E. = 0.27, p = 0.027) received lower amounts of funding. 
The results in Model 4 depict the main effects of disruptive visions. Model 4 confirmed Hypothesis 2 
stating that disruptive vision has a negative effect on the amount of funding (β = -0.27, S.E. = 0.11, p 
= 0.017). Quantitatively, one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision reduced the amount of 
funding by 24 percent. We used the estimations of our full model to calculate the average dollar 
impact of one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision communication.iii For a typical venture 
with a Seed type first round, a one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision communication 
led to an $87,000 decrease in funding received. For a typical venture with an A series first round, a 
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one standard deviation increase in disruptive vision communication led to a $361,000 decrease in 
funding received. 
Robustness Checks 
As seen in Table 2b, the distribution of the dependent variable ‘investment received’ is skewed with 
only 14.8 percent of ventures receiving investment. In our logistic regression models, this may have 
caused separationiv (Heinze & Schemper, 2002) or inconsistent parameter estimates (Donkers, 
Franses, & Verhoef, 2003). We saw no trace of separation in our models. To assess the consistency 
of parameter estimates, we ran additional analyses using randomly drawn, balanced samples (see 
Appendix A for details). Consistent with our main analyses, we observed a significant and positive 
effect of disruptive visions over 10 000 bootstraps (Odds ratio = 1.33, 95% CI = [1.10, 1.69], p = 
0.005). 
The fourth item of the disruptive vision measurement yielded a low Cohen’s Kappa of 0.21. 
Therefore, we excluded the item from the measure of disruptive visions in our main analysis. 
Nevertheless, the item is relevant for theoretical reasons: Central to a new venture’s disruptive 
vision is an innovation (i.e., any novel approach, technology, or business model) allowing it to pursue 
disruption. When including the focal item in our measure for disruptive vision, the results remained 
qualitatively similar for both the likelihood of receiving first-round funding (Model 2, Table 4: βexcluding 
item = 0.20, S.E. = 0.10, p = 0.048; βincluding item = 0.24, S.E. = 0.10, p = 0.019) and the amount of funding 
(Model 4, Table 4: βexcluding item = -0.27, S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.017; βincluding item = -0.34, S.E. = 0.11, p = 0.003).  
DISCUSSION 
Study 1 found that a disruptive vision increased the likelihood of first-round funding while 
decreasing the amount of funding. Study 1 offered these insights from a unique and relevant 
empirical field setting that advises both business practitioners and researchers to consider disruptive 
vision communication when making investment decisions. However, the cross-sectional nature of 
our archival data limits claims of causality. Also, generalizing the findings requires replication in 
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other contexts, and the lack of data on investor sensemaking did not allow us to investigate the 
mechanisms driving the results. To address these issues, we conducted a randomized online 
experiment described next.  
STUDY 2: ONLINE EXPERIMENT ON DISRUPTIVE VISIONS 
METHOD  
Participants  
Two hundred and fifty-three people were enlisted on the Prolific.ac website, a platform for surveys 
and experimental projects. The survey took 12 minutes on average, for which we offered 
compensation in accordance with Prolific.ac rules. To ensure participant quality, we prescreened 
according to the following specifications: first, participants had investment experience with 
exchange-traded commodities or funds, government bonds, stocks, unit trusts, angel (syndicate) 
investing, private equity funds, venture capital funds, options, or crowdfunding. This ensured a 
representative sample of respondent investors. Second, task acceptance rates had to exceed 90 
percent. Third, the level of education had to be undergraduate or higher. Fourth, participants had to 
be at least 25 years old (i.e., no students) with residence in the European Union (including the U.K.), 
U.S., or Australia. 
In both the introduction page and in the survey, we included attention checks to filter out 
participants who answered carelessly. Our final sample comprised 203 participants with 50 percent 
female, averaging 40.5 years old (S.D. = 11.19), with 27 percent having invested in entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
Design 
We designed a 2 (low and high disruptive vision) x 2 (low and high promotion of achievements) 
randomized between-subjects experiment. For each condition, we created a vision statement using 
the same fictitious venture. The vision statement was based on a venture from our Israeli database, 
adapted, and edited to match our purposes (See Appendix B).  
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We anonymized the names of the venture and its founders. To improve the overall credibility of the 
experiment, we added fictitious company information to the vision statements similar to profiles 
presented on Start-Up Nation Finder. This information, as well as the formatting and layout of the 
entire vision statement, was identical across all four conditions. Fictitious profiles featured: founding 
date, funding stage, geographical target markets, product stage, number of employees, business 
model, customers, and estimated valuation.  
Procedure 
The participants first read an introduction page explaining the purpose: to investigate early stage 
investment decisions. We also informed them that we would ask them to answer a survey about 
their investment decisions regarding the venture to be presented. Each participant was randomly 
assigned a condition and read only the venture vision statement central to that condition. After 
manipulation checks, participants were asked if and how much they would invest and answered 
questions to inform our mediator and control variables. The survey ended with a page thanking the 
participants, informing them of the fictitious nature of the information presented about the venture, 
and referring them to the Prolific.ac website for compensation.  
Dependent Variables 
Our two main dependent variables were whether a respondent funded the venture (investment 
received) and the amount of funding they offered. To mirror the Study 1 analysis, we used the log-
transformed values of funding amount in our models. For the investment decision questions, we 
introduced the following vignette:  
“Imagine that you are an investor working for an investment company (e.g., a venture 
capitalist firm). You have to decide how to invest the $500,000 funds you are managing. You 
are expected to earn a minimum of 15% return per year on the fund over the next 5 years.  
ProSearch is one of several investment opportunities. ProSearch is looking for a $100,000 
investment, offering 20% equity ownership (valuing the venture at $500,000).” 
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We next posed the following question to log a participant’s investment decision:  
“Would you… (1) leave the money in the bank, earning a steady 5% yearly interest rate, and 
wait for the next investment opportunity” or (2) Invest (part of) the money in ProSearch?” 
To measure the investment amount, we asked (on the next page):  
“Regardless of your answer on the previous question, if you were to invest in ProSearch, how 
much would you invest in exchange for 20% equity ownership in ProSearch?”  
Participants answered this question on a slider ranging from $1 to $100,000. 
Independent Variables 
Our manipulation of disruptive vision is detailed in Appendix B. We incorporated it as a dummy 
variable in our analyses.v For this variable, zero (0) meant survey participants were exposed to low 
disruptive vision conditions, and one (1) indicated participation in high disruptive vision conditions.  
We measured expectation of extraordinary returns using four items adapted from Huang and Pearce 
(2015). We asked using a five-point Likert scale (1: Very unlikely, 5: Very likely): “What do you think 
is the likelihood ProSearch will achieve one of the following successes?” The outcomes included: 
“Being acquired by another firm at a high price,” “Having a successful Initial Public Offering (IPO),” 
“Yielding tenfold returns to investors,” and “Becoming a market leader” (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.79).  
Control Variables 
Distinct from Study 1, our data for Study 2 posed no variation in venture characteristics. Control 
variables in Study 2 thus pertained only to elements of the manipulation and to investors. Via 
experimental design, we controlled for promotion of achievements. Similar to our disruptive vision 
variable, we treated the promotion of achievements as a dummy variable in our analyses. 
Additionally, we controlled for participants having investment experience in nascent ventures. 
Experience with early stage ventures may shift a participant’s perception of the attractiveness of the 
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investment opportunity. Since risk preference shapes how willing one is to invest in risky efforts, 
such as young ventures, we included risk preference as a control variable. Following Koudstaal et al. 
(2015), we asked the participants to rate on a five-point Likert scale “How much do you describe 
yourself as willing to take risks?” We also included participant age and gender as controls. Lastly, to 
avoid sample-selection bias (that was remedied statistically in Study 1), we included investors 
declining first-round investment into our regressions on amount. This possibility emerged since we 
asked respondents to select an amount even when refusing to invest at all. To control for potential 
variance in the amounts chosen among “yes” and “no” investors, we included the investment made 
variable in our regressions on the amount of funding chosen. 
Table 5 displays the Pearson correlations among the variables in Study 2. 
Analysis 
We applied logistic regression to estimate likelihood of funding. Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression was used to estimate the effect of disruptive vision on the expectation of extraordinary 
return and on the amount of funding awarded by participants. To assess mediation, we conducted 
causal mediation analysis using the ‘mediation’ package in the statistical software R (R Core Team, 
2017; Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014). 
Our analysis involved inconsistent mediation, expressed when the sign of the independent variable’s 
effect on the dependent variable negates due to opposing underlying effects (MacKinnon et al., 
2007). A common example of this model is the relationship between intelligence and production 
mistakes as mediated by boredom. In McFatter’s (1979) hypothetical example of an assembly-line, 
intelligent workers easily got bored and made more production mistakes even though smart people 
tend to be better at preventing production mistakes. As a contradiction, the overall relationship 
between intelligence and production mistakes measured zero. However, adding boredom as a 
mediator unveiled the otherwise hidden opposing impact of intelligence versus boredom on 
production mistakes.  
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RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
To gauge the effectiveness of our manipulation, we queried the sample on several manipulation 
checks. To assess the disruptive vision manipulation, we asked participants to answer on a five-point 
Likert scale (strongly disagree—strongly agree) how much they agreed with these statements: 
“ProSearch says it aims to disrupt the product search and discovery industry,” and “ProSearch has a 
vision about the future of product search and discovery.” One-way ANOVA showed large differences 
between conditions for the ‘disrupt’ (F(3, 199) = 43.10, p < 0.001) and ‘vision’ (F(3, 199) = 2.67, p = 
0.049) queries. For the ‘disrupt’ question, post-hoc contrast analysis indicated significant mean 
differences between all conditions involving ‘high disruptive vision’ and those invoking ‘low 
disruptive vision’ (mean diff. = 3.60, S.E. = 0.32, p < 0.001; Bonferroni adjusted). For the ‘vision’ 
question, a post-hoc contrast analysis of the two conditions involving ‘high disruptive vision’ showed 
participants viewing the ‘high disruptive vision’ conditions as more visionary than those of the ‘low 
disruptive vision’ (mean diff. = 0.49, S.E. = 0.18, p = 0.01; Bonferroni adjusted).  
To assess the effectiveness of our “promotion of achievements” manipulation, we asked participants 
to answer on a five-point Likert scale (strongly disagree—strongly agree) how much they agreed 
with the statement: “ProSearch and its founders communicate their accomplishments.” One-way 
ANOVA showed significant differences between conditions on this question (F(3, 199) = 35.31, p < 
0.001). Post-hoc contrast analysis indicated significant mean differences between all conditions 
involving “high promotion of achievements” versus “low promotion of achievements” (mean diff. = 
2.51, S.E. = 0.25, p < 0.001; Bonferroni adjusted).  
Hypothesis Testing 
Table 6 provides the results of our analyses. Model 4 replicated our findings from Study 1 and 
offered evidence favoring Hypothesis 1. Again, we find that ventures conveying a more disruptive 
vision are more likely to acquire first-round investment (β = 0.74, S.E. = 0.33, p = 0.023). In our 
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experiment, using a highly disruptive vision (vs. no disruptive vision) increased the odds of receiving 
funds by 110 percent. Hypothesis 3 posited that an expectation of extraordinary returns mediates 
the relationship between the venture’s use of a disruptive vision and an investor’s investment 
decision. Model 2 indicated that communicating a highly disruptive vision prompted the expectation 
of extraordinary returns (β = 0.31, S.E. = 0.13, p = 0.02). Model 5 next showed that an expectation of 
extraordinary returns significantly increased the likelihood of an investor opting to fund the venture 
(β = 1.48, S.E. = 0.27, p < 0.001). In our experiment, one standard deviation increase in the 
expectation of extraordinary returns boosted odds of acquiring an investment 4.41 times. 
Subsequently, we conducted mediation analysis and detected evidence for the mediating effect of 
expectation of extraordinary returns (β = 0.08, CI = [0.02, 0.15], p = 0.016, 10 000 bootstrapsvi), thus 
supporting Hypothesis 3.  
Models 6 to 8 in Table 6 show our test of Hypothesis 2 (i.e., communication of a more disruptive 
vision negatively affects the amount of funding). Model 7 offered initial support for Hypothesis 2, 
showing significant negative effect of a disruptive vision on the amount of funding (β = -0.25, S.E. = 
0.11, p = 0.021). Model 8 clearly showed that the effect of a disruptive vision sharpens when 
controlling for expectation of extraordinary returns, implying that inconsistent mediation is present.  
We tested the inconsistent mediating effect of extraordinary returns and found evidence for both 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 in Model 8. Specifically, expectation of extraordinary returns 
positively mediated the relationship between the disruptive vision and the amount of funding (β = 
0.07, CI = [0.2, 0.17], p = 0.015, 10,000 bootstraps), while a disruptive vision had a significant 
negative direct effect on the amount of funding (β = -0.29, CI = [-0.49, -0.07], p = 0.006, 10 000 
bootstraps). Specifically, touting a highly disruptive vision lowered the amount of funding by 25 
percent when controlling for its positive indirect effect on the amount of funding through an 
expectation of extraordinary returns. 
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Robustness Analysis 
In Study 2, we asked participants to state the amount of money they would invest in the venture, 
regardless of whether they decided not to invest initially. Thereby, our analysis of the amount of 
funding in Study 2 includes potential investors that decided not to invest initially. By doing so, our 
experiment avoids sample-selection bias by design, rather than statistically correcting for it 
afterwards. We conducted a subset-analysis for our regression models on amount, excluding people 
who initially decided not to invest in the venture. Results remained consistent with our main 
analysis: In comparison to Model 8 in Table 6, we again observed a significant effect of disruptive 
vision on the amount of funds allocated by investors (βdisruptive vision = -0.24, S.E. = 0.10, p = 0.022; 
βextraordinary return = 0.24, S.E. = 0.06, p < 0.001).  
DISCUSSION 
Results of Study 2 indicated that a more disruptive vision boosted the likelihood of receiving 
investment since it creates an expectation of extraordinary return in the investors. Yet, when 
controlling for this effect on the amounts of funding awarded, we observed that communicating a 
disruptive vision negatively impacted the amount of funding. Study 2 complemented Study 1 in two 
very important ways. First, Study 2 replicated findings for Hypotheses 1 and 2 in a randomized 
controlled setting to uphold the generalizability and the causality of results beyond the cross-
sectional nature of an Israeli context. Second, it allowed the discovery of expectation of 
extraordinary returns as a key mechanism shaping our results from testing Hypotheses 3 and 4.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Entrepreneurs increasingly talk about ‘disruption,’ framing their products, 
technologies and ventures as ‘disruptive’ to secure financial capital from investors. We set 
out to investigate what a disruptive vision entails and how it helps or hampers 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to obtain financial investments. Through two complementary studies, 
we consistently found that highly disruptive visions increased the likelihood of first-round 
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venture funding while also limiting the amount of funding obtained. This finding has 
important theoretical implications for research on disruptive innovations, real options 
theory, impression management, and vision communication. 
Theoretical Implications 
First, our findings demonstrate the importance of disruptive vision as a new form of 
thematic vision content used by entrepreneurs to promote their innovations. This new form of vision 
content enriches research on disruptive innovation and the disruption process, which has thus far 
focused on the process of disruption where underperforming performance attributes gradually 
satisfy customer needs (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). However, prior research 
has also documented that not all potentially disruptive innovations ‘disrupt’ (Sood & Tellis, 2011). 
This variation signals the existence of factors that have been overlooked in examining what drives 
the disruption process (King & Baatartogtokh, 2015; Tellis, 2006). We argue that one of these 
omitted factors is an entrepreneur’s vision communication. Recent research has suggested that the 
process of disruption is best understood from the viewpoint of ‘disruptors’ and how they frame their 
ventures (Ansari et al., 2016). Our results show that disruptive visions are more likely to convince 
investors to get on board—albeit with a smaller amount than for less disruptive narratives. We 
thereby contribute to recent research on disruptive innovations regarding the ways in which firms 
can manage their ecosystems through communication and framing (e.g., Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses 
& Ozcan, 2015).  
Second, we explore how a particular way of framing an entrepreneurial venture can affect 
investors’ sensemaking of the venture as an investment opportunity. In that light, we contribute to 
burgeoning research on entrepreneurs’ efforts in managing the impressions of stakeholders (e.g., 
Fisher, Kuratko, Bloodgood, & Hornsby, 2017; Martens et al., 2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011; van Werven 
et al., 2015; Zott & Huy, 2007). Impression management research has recognized the importance of 
future-oriented communications (Garud et al., 2014), but has not yet studied the impact of such 
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communications on venture-level outcomes. To address this oversight, we highlight the importance 
of investigating vision communication as part of impression management efforts.   
Vision communication is a category of impression management (cf. Zott & Huy, 2007, p. 72). 
In contrast to other forms of impression management, visions showcase the future—that is, what 
the venture/entrepreneur will do and become. As such, the aim of entrepreneurial vision 
communication is to affect audiences’ perceptions of the intrinsic or substantive value of what the 
venture aims to achieve. While prior research has empirically investigated how ventures legitimize 
identity claims, it has focused predominantly on backward-looking communication. However, ‘track 
record touting’ alone does not explain how entrepreneurs build trust toward their ventures’ 
proposed activities. With our investigation of entrepreneurial visions, we address this caveat and 
help scholars to understand how future-oriented communications and their contents shape investor 
sensemaking. In particular, we not only debut and affirm the gravity of disruptive visions (i.e., 
increasing the probability of acquiring funding from investors), but also uncover a potential 
downside to such communications (i.e., attracting lower amounts of funding from investors).  
In addition, our findings enhance the understanding of entrepreneurs’ impression 
management approaches in their quest for acquiring investments. Past research has elaborated on 
various aspects of entrepreneurial communications that affect investment acquisition through the 
establishment of optimal distinctiveness. For example, researchers have noted that elements such as 
aggressiveness, assertiveness, competitiveness, and blasting are powerful tools entrepreneurs may 
use to distinguish themselves in the eyes of investors (Parhankangas & Ehrlich, 2014). Similarly 
entrepreneurs may use the communication of accomplishments and accrued resources to legitimize 
their identity claims (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2017; Burton et al., 2002; Hallen, 2008; Martens et al., 
2007; Navis & Glynn, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007). Many of these impression management tactics and 
symbolic aspects yield synergistic effects that strengthen a distinct, collective perception about 
ventures and entrepreneurs (e.g., a high growth venture, Baum et al., 1998; an aspiring market 
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leader, Martens et al., 2007; a collaborator or competitor, Ansari et al., 2016). Articulation of 
integrative themes may serve special purposes for entrepreneurs. For example, research by Hallen 
(2008) has suggested that communication of prior accomplishments helps young ventures to form 
notable ties with key ecosystem members. By conceptualizing disruptive visions, we promote 
valuable understanding of integrative themes in entrepreneurial communications; this opens the 
door for future research to further investigate how particular content in an entrepreneurial 
communication may influence audience sensemaking and venture outcomes. 
Third, we provide new insights regarding both real options and impression management 
theories to explain investment decisions under uncertainty. On the one hand, the main underlying 
rationale in impression management theory is that the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding 
entrepreneurial activities make it hard for investors to assess the quality of a venture’s value 
proposition. This is why investors rely on cues communicated through entrepreneur’s impression 
management efforts. Still, it is important to note that impression management research alone does 
not fully explain our findings. Indeed, this stream of research would predict a positive effect of 
disruptive vision on amounts of funding, since the use of disruptive visions has become increasingly 
popular (Christensen et al., 2015), and entrepreneurs derive legitimacy for their touted identities 
from innovation, novelty, and publicized change (Navis & Glynn, 2011). On the other hand, real 
options theory builds its arguments on the intricate balance between upside potential and risk that 
motivates real options logic in investors. However, this stream of research cannot explain how 
communicating a disruptive vision would affect investor real option decision making when it has 
thus far overlooked the role of impression management (cf. Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). We combine 
both streams of research to explain how disruptive visions affect investment decisions. Here, our 
work shows that impression management efforts, such as disruptive visions, may have variant 
effects on how investors select ventures as real options and how they allocate funds to them. In so 
doing, we not only draw from these research streams, but also significantly advance them and 
motivate researchers in both fields to integrate the two in understanding investor decision making. 
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Fourth, our results challenge prior research that has highlighted unilateral positive returns from 
strong vision communication (Baum et al., 1998; Baum & Locke, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Stam, 
2014). We engage the calls for research into vision content (for a recent review, see Van 
Knippenberg & Stam, 2014) and propose the framing of vision content with a focus on disruption. 
Specifically, prior vision research has centered strongly on how visions are communicated (style) 
rather than on what is communicated (content). For example, scholars have focused on the 
effectiveness of repetition, rhythm, balance, contrasts, lists, puzzles, alliteration, imagery, analogies 
and metaphors, classification, generalization, and authority (Carton et al., 2014; Conger, 1991; Den 
Hartog & Verburg, 1998; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; van Werven et al., 2015). Yet, these investigations 
omit the influence of vision content. Our emphasis on vision content allows a more in-depth 
understanding of the vision content–vision pursuit relationship (Stam et al., 2014), reminding 
scholars that the framing of visions is an essential part of an entrepreneur’s communications, but 
may have downsides that should be duly investigated.  
Managerial Implications 
Our findings have strong implications for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs must be made aware that 
the content of their vision communication affects investors’ perceptions of their venture. The vision 
statement plays a critical role in communicating the goal and purpose of the organization and must 
be crafted with care. In particular, despite the popularity of disruptive visions in practice, our study 
suggests that entrepreneurs should use them judiciously. While communicating a highly disruptive 
vision increases the likelihood of receiving an investment, it subsequently reduces the amount of 
funds endowed in that investment. Furthermore, our operationalization of disruptive vision provides 
entrepreneurs with a template for the key characteristics of a specific form of vision content, 
allowing them to craft vision statements in ways that exploit or avoid communicating a disruptive 
vision. Expanding beyond prior vision communication research, our study specifically enables 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
entrepreneurs to purposefully evaluate the content of their vision statements based on a pre-
defined set of items, granting them greater control over their impression management efforts. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Investors’ funding decisions are more complex than we explain in our study, since the investment 
process is inherently multistage and involves communications at each stage (Eckhardt, Shane, & 
Delmar, 2006; Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, & Strebulaev, 2016). While we show that entrepreneurial 
visions matter at the first stage in the investor selection process, future research should assess the 
consequences of entrepreneurial vision communication at later stages in the funding process, such 
as when moving toward an IPO. 
Since visions of entrepreneurs regarding their ventures are not static, neither are disruptive visions. 
Entrepreneurs may revise their visions over time as they acquire new information or experience. 
Rapid achievements may trigger the creation of grander visions, and failures could serve as reality 
checks that, instead, moderate visions. Recent research has advised that ventures presenting 
disruptive frames may go on to alter their communications to be more respectful of competitive 
pressures (Ansari et al., 2016; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). Since refinements are rare in the early stages 
of venture funding (e.g., the first funding rounds), we do not expect this factor to affect our results. 
Future research can examine changes in vision content over time. 
Finally, we acknowledge that firms can also promote themselves as disruptors or as having achieved 
disruption. Thus, disruption can also form an integral part of how ventures craft their identities in 
their communications about the past. However, our current operationalization of promotion of 
achievements did not consider this, since it is unlikely that younger ventures can legitimately claim 
much history of successful disruption. Future research can investigate whether older, more 
established ventures may also frame their identities around disruption and if this helps them in 
acquiring funds during later rounds. 
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Table I. Examples of disruptive vision and promotion of achievements. 
 Disruptive Vision
a Promotion of 
achievements
b
 
Venture and vision statement 
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Twiggle: “Twiggle is setting the standard for a new paradigm of 
Product Search & Discovery: providing a robust data 
infrastructure for matching products to user intent with an 
unprecedented degree of accuracy, nuance, and coverage. We 
understood that, with our approach to cleaning and structuring 
data, we could enable a search experience that would 
revolutionize the capabilities of major search and e-commerce 
companies to understand their users’ needs. Today, our unique 
approach to classifying, recommending, and displaying products 
significantly outperforms existing search technologies, including 
those of major retailers and search engines. Using our expertise 
in search and data science, we make products and product-
related information easily accessible and incredibly useful to 
users, which ultimately removes barriers in dealing with product 
selection and purchase decisions. Team Twiggle is made up of 
an elite team of data scientists and engineers – ex-Google, IBM, 
BCG, Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and Duke, from top 
intelligence units of the Israeli Army, with over 30 US patents in 
search-related fields between them. The company is led by Amir 
Konigsberg (CEO & Co-founder) and Adi Avidor (CTO & Co-
founder), two ex-Google PhDs with an accomplished track 
record in start-ups and multinationals in the fields of search and 
e-commerce.” 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Collage Medical Imaging: “The company’s patented 
technology integrates very high resolution, short range, Optical 
Coherence Tomography technology with Spatial Localization 
Technology in a patent pending unique combination that enables, 
for the first time, reliable virtual tissue reconstruction of human 
organs at the microscopic level. The company’s breakthrough 
system makes possible real time diagnosis, and provides 
unparalleled detailed microscopic mapping of the cancerous 
tissue within body organs. The end result is a micron level 
resolution virtual tissue reconstruction of the entire organ which 
is far superior to the resolution obtainable by known modalities 
such as MRI, CT, and Ultrasound. The company’s mission is to 
provide a technology having the potential of complimenting and 
ultimately replacing traditional cancer diagnostics. Collage 
Medical Imaging was founded in 2014 as an Incubit Ventures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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company.” 
JAGO: “JAGO’s PlayDate platform empowers parents to 
schedule, manage, and track their kids’ social lives in a single 
intuitive app. Our vision is to transform the way parents manage 
their kids’ social lives, changing the paradigm from on-the-fly 
arrangements to seamless scheduling and management. We 
anticipate a time where family event planning will be as 
organized and controlled as a workplace calendar. The system’s 
ability to manage  the digital relationships between children, 
their friends, parents, additional caregivers, and parents of 
friends is the essence of the application. Our technological vision 
is to capture, manage, and enhance those relationships.” 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Fone.do: “Fone.do is developing a revolutionary simple to use, 
low cost intelligent business phone system you can set up 
yourself in a few minutes. We do things differently. Fone.do is a 
complete phone system for small business. You can use it from 
your web browser, mobile, and desk phones. One number that 
receives calls everywhere, anytime. We are proud that the 
Fone.do team is made up of creative people from diverse 
backgrounds. Together we are changing the way small 
businesses communicate.” 
Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
AppInsight: “AppInsight generates security vulnerability 
reports for any app, along with detailed remediation guidelines, 
automatically and without any integration to the development 
process. We continuously scan your apps for the latest known 
vulnerabilities and proactively alert you when new threats to 
your app are detected, prioritized according to severity level. 
AppInsight ranks the security posture of your apps, compared to 
millions of apps that have already been analyzed. By doing so, 
we have built a huge database of mobile apps. Our group of top 
notch security experts from the IDF elite intelligence corps 
leverages their extensive experience and best practices to help 
you rectify every detected vulnerability and threat. Our vision is 
to create the industry standard for mobile application security.” 
No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Singular: “Singular is a SaaS platform that unifies the 
fragmented digital marketing space. Singular has built a much 
differentiated technology that enables marketers to seamlessly 
integrate all of their different marketing systems into a singular 
platform, without requiring an SDK integration or dedicated 
engineering resources. Their unique solution and technology has 
enabled them to grow incredibly fast in the past two years, and 
today they are working with some of the largest and most 
sophisticated digital marketers in the world: Twitter, Facebook, 
Match.com, Tinder, Supercell, Glassdoor, Glu, Kabam, 
Wallapop, Poshmark, GrabTaxi, and many others.” 
No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
BigaBid: “BigaBid is a data driven, data science focused 
solution designed for performance marketing in the mobile 
advertising industry. Through real time optimization and user 
profiling, BigaBid leverages unrefined user data and aggregates 
No No No No No No No 
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it into actionable audience profiles based on key behavior, 
location, and content trends. The data above is obtained by us 
through both our ongoing media acquisition activities, as well as 
through studying the advertiser’s historical data. We zoom in on 
the most relevant, highly actionable users and build profiles 
based on them. These profiles, when coupled with multiple 
layers of mobile-specific data, and with the scale and reach of 
programmatic media buying, allow us to hit your KPIs on every 
single ad campaign, eliminate wastage and improve our 
predictive abilities toward your next campaign with us.” 
CoolaData: “CoolaData is a cloud-based solution which covers 
all big data infrastructure components for data tracking, 
warehousing, ETL, data enrichment – all the way to the 
visualization layer. It’s an open data service that is not limited to 
proprietary tools. Connect to your data, to all your data points – 
It unifies data from a multitude of external and internal sources, 
inspects it as one unit, and visualizes the most comprehensive 
business insights from a richer analytical framework. CoolaData 
helps to analyze, visualize, predict, and act on big data, without 
dedicated resources. With CoolaData you boost your BI agility 
and time-to-insight becomes immediate.”  
No No No No No No No 
a. The disruptive vision items are (left to right): “The vision statement…”  “promotes drastic change in the 
future: it makes a claim of pursuing dramatic change at a market or larger level, with implicit 
consequences for multiple stakeholders,” “features a future that contrasts with the status quo: it 
delineates deficiencies in the current market situation and promises a substantial improvement,” 
“includes ideas, plans or other evidence of achieving the conventional market objective in a completely 
different manner” and “promotes the venture’s innovation or activities as enabling a completely new 
function.” 
b. People includes the item “features evidence of past performance/experience of entrepreneurs and 
employees.”  
Venture comprises the item “presents evidence of past and current successes of venture in the market, 
including customers, locations, market leadership, and awards and prizes” 
Resources matches the item “features claims of accrued resources, such as latest/proprietary technology, 
partnerships/networks/affiliations, and patents/prototypes.” 
c. The ‘new function’ item was not included in the empirical measure of disruptive vision due to low Cohen’s 
Kappa reliability. 
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Table IIA. Study 1 descriptive statistics for continuous variables. 
 
Minimum Median 
Arithmetic 
Mean 
Geometric 
Mean 
Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Amount of funding received 
(in ’000$) 
10.00 1000.00 2199.39 905.23 25 000.00 3521.71 
Disruptive vision 0.00 0.50 0.61 1.45 3.00 0.78 
Promotion of achievements 0.00 0.50 0.52 1.42 3.00 0.62 
Imagery 0.00 0.04 0.05 1.04 0.21 0.03 
Social media exposure 0.00 2.00 1.79 2.43 4.00 1.35 
Venture age 0.00 2.00 1.94 2.79 3.00 0.86 
Number of tags 1.00 7.00 7.60 7.96 31.00 3.32 
Geographic scope 1.00 1.00 1.25 2.19 6.00 0.63 
Investor experience 1.00 4.00 9.30 6.28 85.00 13.02 
 
 
Table IIB. Study 1 descriptive statistics for dummy variables. 
 
0 1 Percentage 
Investment received 782 136 14.81 
Subsidiary 849 69 7.52 
Member of program 768 150 16.34 
Sector Software 522 396 43.14 
Sector Healthcare 807 111 12.09 
Sector Security and Safety 837 81 8.82 
Serial entrepreneur 486 432 47.06 
Product released 565 353 38.45 
A-round 112 24 17.65 
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Table III. Pearson correlations of Study 1.  
  Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Investment received          
2 Amount of funding received (log)  -0.04         
3 Disruptive vision 0.06┼ -0.11        
4 Promotion of achievements 0.14*** 0.19** 0.07*       
5 Imagery 0.01 -0.18* 0.25*** 0.12***      
6 Social media exposure 0.24*** 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.05     
7 Venture age 0.08* -0.18* 0.07 0.04 0.08* 0.22***    
8 Subsidiary 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01   
9 Member of program 0.11** -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.07*  
10 Number of tags (log)  0.15*** 0.01 -0.01 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.08* 0.06┼ -0.02 
11 Sector Software -0.06┼ -0.06 0.02 -0.06┼ 0.02 0.12*** -0.04 0.07* 0.00 
12 Sector Healthcare 0.00 0.14┼ 0.06┼ 0.12*** -0.05 -0.25*** -0.02 -0.04 0.00 
13 Sector Security and Safety 0.14*** 0.23** -0.01 0.14*** -0.07* -0.05 -0.09** -0.03 0.00 
14 Serial entrepreneur 0.09** 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.13*** -0.08* -0.05 0.10** 
15 Geographic scope 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 0.02 0.08* -0.02 
16 R leased product 0.13*** -0.01 -0.07* 0.05 0.07* 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.16*** -0.03 
17 A-round  0.45*** -0.04 0.16┼ -0.07 0.18* -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 
18 Investor experience  0.26*** 0.10 0.15* 0.02 -0.02 -0.19** -0.09 0.08 
┼ 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table III. Pearson correlations of Study 1 (cont.).  
  Name 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Investment received         
2 Amount of funding received (log)          
3 Disruptive vision         
4 Promotion of achievements         
5 Imagery         
6 Social media exposure         
7 Venture age         
8 Subsidiary         
9 Member of program         
10 Number of tags (log)          
11 Sector Software -0.22***        
12 Sector Healthcare 0.04 -0.32***       
13 Sector Security and Safety 0.08* -0.27*** -0.12***      
14 Serial entrepreneur 0.05 0.01 -0.12*** 0.05     
15 Geographic scope 0.17*** 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.02    
16 Released product 0.15*** 0.08* -0.16*** 0.01 -0.03 0.10**   
17 A-round 0.15
┼ -0.07 0.07 0.13 -0.08 0.08 0.08  
18 Investor experience -0.10 0.17* -0.09 0.05 0.17* -0.02 0.05 0.11 
┼ 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table IV. Study 1 results. 
Dependent variable  
Investment received  
(1 = Yes) 
Amount of funding received 
(’000$) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
 
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
 
 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
 
Intercept -4.16*** 
(0.72) 
-4.30*** 
(0.73) 
15.38*** 
(0.79) 
15.27*** 
(0.85) 
Independent 
variable 
Disruptive vision - 0.20* 
(0.10) 
- -0.27** 
(0.11) 
Control 
variables 
Promotion of achievements 0.27** 
(0.09) 
0.26** 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
0.00 
(0.13) 
 
Imagery 0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.20┼ 
(0.11) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
 
Social media exposure 0.69*** 
(0.12) 
0.68*** 
(0.12) 
- - 
 
Venture age 0.13 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.24┼ 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
 
Subsidiary 0.02 
(0.38) 
0.00 
(0.38) 
0.87┼ 
(0.46) 
0.90* 
(0.45) 
 
Member of program 0.63** 
(0.24) 
0.62** 
(0.24) 
-0.45 
(0.32) 
-0.47 
(0.32) 
 
Number of tags  
(log) 
0.70* 
(0.30) 
0.76* 
(0.31) 
- - 
 
Sector dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Serial entrepreneur 0.36┼ 
(0.21) 
0.36┼ 
(0.21) 
0.10 
(0.28) 
0.13 
(0.28) 
 
Geographic scope -0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.25┼ 
(0.14) 
-0.26┼ 
(0.13) 
 
Released product 0.30 
(0.22) 
0.34 
(0.22) 
-0.61* 
(0.27) 
-0.64* 
(0.28) 
 
A-round 
- - 
1.42*** 
(0.31) 
1.43*** 
(0.31) 
 
Investor experience 
- - 
0.24* 
(0.11) 
0.27* 
(0.11) 
Full model 
diagnostics 
AIC 685.42 683.60   
Sigma 
- - 
1.70*** 
(0.25) 
1.64*** 
(0.26) 
 
rho 
- - 
-0.82*** 
(0.11) 
-0.81*** 
(0.13) 
 
Log likelihooda  
(df.) 
-328.71*** 
(14) 
-326.80*** 
(15) 
-547.90*** 
(30) 
-544.26*** 
(32) 
 
Likelihood ratio test against 
competing models  
(df.) 
- 
3.83┼ 
(1) 
- 7.28* 
(2) 
 Observations 918 918 136 136 
┼ 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standardized coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses (S.E.). 
a Significance refers to the results of a likelihood ratio test of model fit against the null model. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Table V. Pearson correlations of Study 2. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
1 Investment received (1 = Yes)         
2 Amount of funding 0.45***        
3 Disruptive vision (dummy) 0.14┼ -0.08       
4 Expectation of extraordinary return 0.48*** 0.41*** 0.13┼      
5 Promotion of achievements (dummy) 0.18** 0.16* -0.01 0.21**     
6 Investment experience (1 = Yes) -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.15* 0.03    
7 Risk preference  0.13┼ 0.03 -0.07 0.14* -0.01 0.16*   
8 Age  -0.15* 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.14*  
9 Gender (Male =1) -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.20** 0.00 0.05 0.22** -0.05 
┼ 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table VI. Study 2 regression results. 
 
Expectation of extraordinary 
returns (OLS) 
Investment received 
(logistic regression) 
Amount of funding  
(log-linear regression) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) 
Intercept 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.23 
(0.14) 
0.64* 
(0.28) 
0.22 
(0.34) 
0.61 
(0.39) 
3.04*** 
(0.12) 
3.16*** 
(0.13) 
3.33*** 
(0.14) 
         
Disruptive vision  
 0.31* 
(0.13) 
 0.74* 
(0.33) 
0.53 
(0.37) 
 -0.25* 
(0.11) 
-0.29** 
(0.11) 
Expectation of 
Extraordinary returns  
    1.48*** 
(0.27) 
  0.22*** 
(0.06) 
Promotion of 
achievements 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
0.42** 
(0.13) 
0.87** 
(0.32) 
0.91** 
(0.33) 
0.54 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
Investment experience 
0.30┼ 
(0.15) 
0.32* 
(0.15) 
-0.24 
(0.36) 
-0.20 
(0.36) 
-0.73┼ 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
Risk preference  
0.17* 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.31┼ 
(0.17) 
0.34* 
(0.17) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Age 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.31* 
(0.16) 
-0.34* 
(0.16) 
-0.31┼ 
(0.18) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Gender 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-0.5*** 
(0.13) 
-0.29 
(0.33) 
-0.32 
(0.33) 
0.38 
(0.40) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
Investment made 
     0.81*** 
(0.12) 
0.85*** 
(0.12) 
0.65*** 
(0.13) 
R- squared 0.14 0.17    0.22 0.24 0.29 
F-statistic (df1/df2) & 
Log likelihooda (df.) 
6.64*** 
(5/197) 
6.57*** 
(6/196) 
-117.94** 
(6) 
-115.30** 
(7) 
-92.34*** 
(8) 
9.26*** 
(6/196) 
8.9*** 
(7/195) 
9.86*** 
(8/194) 
Testb against competing 
models (df.) 
 5.49* 
(1) 
 5.28* 
(1) 
45.92*** 
(1) 
 5.45* 
(1) 
12.81*** 
(1) 
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AIC   247.89 244.60 200.68    
┼ 
p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous variables: expectation of extraordinary returns, risk 
preference, and age. Standard errors are in parentheses (S.E.). 
A F-STATISTIC WAS REPORTED FOR THE OLS REGRESSIONS ON EXPECTATION OF EXTRAORDINARY RETURNS AND AMOUNT OF FUNDING. LOG LIKELIHOOD 
WAS REPORTED FOR THE LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS ON INVESTMENT RECEIVED. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VALUES REFERS TO THE RESULTS OF A TEST OF MODEL 
FIT AGAINST THE TRIVIAL MODEL.  
B FOR THE OLS REGRESSION, THE WALD TEST WAS USED (F-TEST STATISTIC), AND THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION APPLIED A LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST (Χ
2
 TEST 
STATISTIC).
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APPENDIX 
A. Balanced Sample Bootstrap Analysis 
To assess the robustness of our parameter estimates in Study 1, where data showed imbalance in the 
dependent variable of our logistic regression, we ran a balanced sample non-parametric bootstrap 
analysis (as suggested by Donkers et al., 2003). For each bootstrap iteration, we randomly drew (with 
replacement) a subsample of ventures in which no investment was made, equal in size to the subsample 
of ventures that did obtain investment. Since we observed 116 ventures receiving first-round 
investment, we randomly drew 116 ventures that did not. Each bootstrap thus features a sample size of 
N=232.  
Since each logistic regression was estimated on its own log scale, we may compare only standardized 
effects, even when model specifications remain identical for subsequent analyses. Therefore, we used 
the odds ratio for each bootstrap coefficient to compute mean bootstrapped effects for each variable. 
Additionally, we report bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals below (DiCiccio & Efron, 
1996), as well as p-values that correspond to the proportion of coefficients opposing the reported 
effects (Tingley et al., 2014). To clarify, a p-value of 0.01 signifies a 1 percent chance that (given our 
bootstrapped analysis) the odds ratio is actually 1. 
Table VII. Balanced sample bootstrap results. 
 Odds Ratio Lower CI Upper CI p-value 
Intercept 0.09 0.03 0.56 >0.001 
Disruptive vision 1.33 1.10 1.69 0.005 
Promotion of achievements 1.35 1.07 1.78 0.016 
Imagery 1.00 0.84 1.22 0.914 
Social media exposure 2.05 1.61 2.71 >0.001 
Venture age 1.14 0.91 1.42 0.285 
Subsidiary 1.46 0.76 5.22 0.564 
Member of program 1.96 1.21 4.11 0.023 
Number of tags (log) 2.48 1.37 5.12 0.010 
Sector dummies Included 
Serial entrepreneur 1.47 0.99 2.34 0.098 
Geographic scope 0.98 0.80 1.37 0.751 
Released products  1.34 0.86 2.22 0.267 
We used 10 000 bootstraps with bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. 
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B. Online Experiment Vision Statement Manipulations 
Experimental Condition 1: High disruptive vision—high promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
  
ProSearch is revolutionizing Product Search & Discovery: we provide a groundbreaking data infrastructure for 
matching products to user intent with an unprecedented degree of accuracy, nuance, and coverage. 
  
Our product 
Most e-commerce companies are still relying on keyword matching and behavioral data to power their search. Our 
technology is a natural language processing and artificial intelligence layer that helps retailers really understand 
what their customers want and present them with the best search results. We only take a small percentage of each 
sale made with our system. 
  
Our vision 
ProSearch will change the way in which people search and discover new products. We have envisioned a disruptive 
product search technology tailored to the highly competitive e-commerce industry. With our new cutting-edge 
approach to cleaning and structuring data, we enable a search experience that revolutionizes the capabilities of 
major search and e-commerce companies in understanding their users’ needs and providing qualified, relevant 
results. This inevitably boosts relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater profitability. We will disrupt the 
world of e-commerce and become the global leader in product search and discovery! 
   
Where we are today 
By partnering with leading scientific institutions in the field of data science, we have created a patented unique 
approach that significantly outperforms existing product search technologies, including those of major retailers 
and search engines. We make products and product-related information easily accessible and extremely useful to 
users, ultimately removing barriers in, and redefining ways of dealing with product selection and purchase 
decisions. We have recently attracted large corporate customers from the United States, thereby expanding our 
operational scope. ProSearch was finalist in the 2016 International Trade Fair for Ideas, Inventions, and New 
Products, and took home a cash prize of $500. 
  
The team 
ProSearch employs a visionary team of data scientists and engineers —ex-Google, IBM, BCG, Harvard, Stanford, 
Princeton, and Duke, with over 30 US patents in search-related fields between them. The company is led by Jeff 
Martin (CEO & Co-founder) and Darryl Walker (CTO & Co-founder), two ex-Google PhDs with accomplished track 
records in start-ups and multinationals in the fields of search and e-commerce. They envision a future where 
consumers find products effortlessly and instantly.  
  
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
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Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
Customers: 9 
  
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
 
 
Experimental Condition 2: High disruptive vision—low promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
  
ProSearch is revolutionizing Product Search & Discovery: we provide a groundbreaking data infrastructure for 
matching products to user intent with an unprecedented degree of accuracy, nuance, and coverage. 
  
Our product 
Most e-commerce companies are still relying on keyword matching and behavioral data to power their search. Our 
technology is a natural language processing and artificial intelligence layer that helps retailers really understand 
what their customers want and present them with the best search results. We only take a small percentage of each 
sale made with our system. 
  
Our vision 
ProSearch will change the way in which people search and discovery new products. We have envisioned a 
disruptive product search technology tailored to the highly competitive e-commerce industry. With our new 
approach to cleaning and structuring data, we enable a search experience that revolutionizes the capabilities of 
major search and e-commerce companies in understanding their users’ needs and providing qualified, relevant 
results. This inevitably boosts relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater profitability. We will disrupt the 
world of e-commerce and become the global leader in product search and discovery! 
   
Where we are today 
We have created a unique approach that significantly outperforms existing search technologies, including those of 
major retailers and search engines. We make products and product-related information easily accessible and 
extremely useful to users, ultimately removing barriers in, and redefining ways of dealing with product selection 
and purchase decisions. ProSearch presented their idea at the 2017 International Trade Fair for Ideas, Inventions, 
and New Products. 
   
The team 
ProSearch employs a visionary team of data scientists and engineers. The company is led by Jeff Martin (CEO & Co-
founder) and Darryl Walker (CTO & Co-founder). They envision a future where consumers find products effortlessly 
and instantly.    
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Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
Customers: 9 
  
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
 
 
Experimental Condition 3: Low disruptive vision—high promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
  
ProSearch has developed a Product Search & Discovery solution: we provide a data infrastructure for matching 
products to user intent with a high degree of accuracy, nuance, and coverage. 
  
Our product 
Our technology is a natural language processing and artificial intelligence layer that helps retailers understand 
what their customers want and present them with the best search results. We only take a small percentage of each 
sale made with our system. 
  
Our goal 
ProSearch delivers a superior search and discovery technology for products. Our product search solution is tailored 
to the highly competitive e-commerce industry. With our cutting-edge approach to cleaning and structuring data, 
we enable a search experience that helps major search and e-commerce companies to understand their users’ 
needs and provide qualified, relevant results. This increases relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater 
profitability. 
   
Where we are today 
By partnering with leading scientific institutions in the field of data science, we have created a patented approach 
that outperforms existing product search technologies. Tests show that 90% of users recommended our solution 
over existing solutions. We make products and product-related information easily accessible and useful to users, 
facilitating product selection and purchase decisions. We recently attracted large corporate customers from the 
United States, expanding our operational scope. ProSearch was also finalist in the 2017 International Trade Fair for 
Ideas, Inventions, and New Products, and took home a cash prize of $500. 
   
The team 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
ProSearch employs an elite team of data scientists and engineers—ex-Google, IBM, BCG, Harvard, Stanford, 
Princeton, and Duke, with over 30 US patents in search-related fields between them. The company is led by Jeff 
Martin (CEO & Co-founder) and Darryl Walker (CTO & Co-founder), two ex-Google PhDs with accomplished track 
records in start-ups and multinationals in the fields of search and e-commerce. 
  
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
B2B customers: 9 
 
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000 
 
Experimental Condition 4: Low disruptive vision—low promotion of achievements 
 
ProSearch 
A Search Engine for E-commerce 
  
ProSearch has developed a Product Search & Discovery solution: we provide a data infrastructure for matching 
products to user intent with accuracy, nuance, and coverage.   
 
Our product 
Our technology is a natural language processing and artificial intelligence layer that helps retailers understand 
what their customers want and present them with the best search results. We only take a small percentage of each 
sale made with our system.  
 
Our goal 
ProSearch delivers a superior search and discovery technology for products. Our product search solution is tailored 
to the highly competitive e-commerce industry. With our approach to cleaning and structuring data, we enable a 
search experience that helps major search and e-commerce companies to understand their users’ needs and 
provide qualified, relevant results. This increases relevancy and conversion rates, leading to greater profitability. 
   
Where we are today 
We have created an approach that outperforms existing product search technologies. We make products and 
product-related information easily accessible and useful to users, facilitating product selection and purchase 
decisions. ProSearch presented their idea at the 2017 International Trade Fair for Ideas, Inventions, and New 
Products. 
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The team 
ProSearch employs a team of data scientists and engineers. The company is led by Jeff Martin (CEO & Co-founder) 
and Darryl Walker (CTO & Co-founder). 
     
Additional information 
Founded: 02/2017 
Funding stage: Seed 
Geographical markets: USA, Europe, Middle-East, Asia. 
Product stage: Released 
Employees: 10 
Business model: Business to business 
B2B customers: 9 
 
Estimated valuation (based on similar companies): $500,000     
 
 
NOTES  
 
 
 
i
 We tested and ascertained the robustness of our findings when this item is included. See the robustness analyses 
section of Study 1 on page 24.  
ii
 Although logistic regression and Probit regressions provide similar results and conclusions, the interpretation of 
their coefficients is not identical because of the difference in link functions (Greene, 2012). In a Probit model, the 
value of a coefficient is understood as the increase in z-value on a cumulative distribution function. This can be 
used to determine marginal probabilities, which are contingent on the chosen values of other variables entered 
into the Probit model. 
iii
 We used our model estimations to predict values for typical ventures. We only varied disruptive vision and round 
type, taking the average value for all other continuous variables and the most frequent value for dummy variables. 
We let the disruptive vision variable vary from its lowest to its highest possible value, in one standard deviation 
increments. To calculate the average dollar impact, we took the average of the differences between subsequent 
predicted values. Since our dependent variable was log-transformed, we corrected the predicted values for the 
logarithmic scale in accordance with Duan (1983). 
iv
 In the fitting process of a logistic model, separation (or monotone likelihood) can occur if the likelihood 
converges while at least one parameter estimate diverges to infinity. We applied the ‘detect separation’ function 
from the ‘brglm2’ package in the statistical software R (Kosmidis, Pagui, & Sartori, 2018; R Core Team, 2017). 
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v
 Since our experimental manipulations used a 2x2 disruptive vision–promotion of achievements design, we 
included the interaction term in our models as a robustness check. By doing so, we aimed to rule out the ‘high 
disruptive vision–high promotion of achievements’ condition as driving the observed effects. In none of our 
models did we find strong evidence of an interaction effect (lowest p-value = 0.09; interaction added to Model 8, 
Table 6). 
vi
 We used non-parametric bootstrapping with bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals (DiCiccio 
& Efron, 1996). 
